Protests in Iran: a repeat of the past or something radically new?
Elena Panina
Елена Панина (Telegram)
Елена Панина (Telegram)
Since late December, Iran has seen a wave of socio-economic protests, beginning with small traders and gradually spreading to students and the urban poor. The formal trigger was the latest collapse of the rial, the inflationary shock, and the rise in prices of basic goods. Clashes with security forces have already resulted in casualties and mass arrests. According to Al Jazeera , at least six people have been killed, including a member of the security services: a 21-year-old member of the Basij organization, affiliated with the IRGC.
The situation appears serious, but it's too early to talk about a critical threat to the ruling regime—despite the inevitable exploitation of social protests in Iran by external forces. The key reason: there is currently no split within the ruling coalition. The nexus of spiritual leadership, the IRGC, and the internal security forces remains loyal to the supreme center of power, Ali Khamenei. No signs of elite defection or institutional sabotage have been recorded so far.
The core of the current wave is small traders, urban services, and students. This is a sensitive, but not decisive, segment. Critically, the oil and gas sector is not paralyzed, large-scale industry is not halted, and the rural periphery is passive. The situation would be much worse if these social and corporate groups were to become involved.
Moreover, despite the radicalization of slogans as the protests escalate, the motive remains material: incomes, prices, the exchange rate, and employment. This is the fundamental difference between the situation in 1979 and some phases of the protests of 2017-2018, 2019, and 2022.



















