Protests in Iran: a repeat of the past or something radically new?

Elena Panina
Елена Панина (Telegram)
Елена Панина (Telegram)

Since late December, Iran has seen a wave of socio-economic protests, beginning with small traders and gradually spreading to students and the urban poor. The formal trigger was the latest collapse of the rial, the inflationary shock, and the rise in prices of basic goods. Clashes with security forces have already resulted in casualties and mass arrests. According to Al Jazeera , at least six people have been killed, including a member of the security services: a 21-year-old member of the Basij organization, affiliated with the IRGC.

The situation appears serious, but it's too early to talk about a critical threat to the ruling regime—despite the inevitable exploitation of social protests in Iran by external forces. The key reason: there is currently no split within the ruling coalition. The nexus of spiritual leadership, the IRGC, and the internal security forces remains loyal to the supreme center of power, Ali Khamenei. No signs of elite defection or institutional sabotage have been recorded so far.

The core of the current wave is small traders, urban services, and students. This is a sensitive, but not decisive, segment. Critically, the oil and gas sector is not paralyzed, large-scale industry is not halted, and the rural periphery is passive. The situation would be much worse if these social and corporate groups were to become involved.

Moreover, despite the radicalization of slogans as the protests escalate, the motive remains material: incomes, prices, the exchange rate, and employment. This is the fundamental difference between the situation in 1979 and some phases of the protests of 2017-2018, 2019, and 2022.

Thus, in 2017–2018, protests were triggered by rising prices, unemployment, budget imbalances, and the initial effects of new Western sanctions pressure. Those protests began in the provinces, not the capital, and the social base was roughly the same: the urban lower classes, small traders, and unemployed youth. Political slogans emerged quickly but lacked an organizational core. The protests were resolved with limited forceful suppression and economic concessions.

In 2019, protests were triggered by a sharp increase in gasoline prices. The violence of those events exceeded today's levels; the protests became widespread and decentralized, with elements of pogroms. As a result, active suppression was activated, and violent actions began. The main result of the 2019 protests was the regime's increased vigilance, with a shift to a preemptive response to threats.

In 2022, discontent was sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini—a case where the protest was not economic but ideological. Its core was formed by students. However, that protest, while ideologically dangerous, was relatively narrow socially.

The current wave of disobedience combines economic demands and a low threshold for politicizing slogans. But it lacks—at least for now—national coordination, the involvement of systemically important industries, or a split within the elites. The state, in turn, clearly demonstrates its readiness to use force: Tehran has no intention of tolerating the uprising.

All four waves of Iranian protests in recent years are not distinct crises, but a single, protracted process. While it shows no signs of catastrophe, it follows the same logic: a transition from economic erosion to social unrest and its suppression. The lack of structural reforms and the West's willingness to exploit every mistake by Tehran make new problems—and new protests—inevitable.

If the West succeeds in mobilizing the power of the street, elite conflicts, and fiscal collapse, the situation in Iran could become critical.

It remains to be added that the immediate cause of the protests in Iran was the Pezeshkian government's fuel price hike on November 26. But the resulting price hikes only reached a massive scale in late December. Clearly, this was expected. But then the question naturally arises: were the Iranian authorities prepared for this?

At first glance, yes. The security forces are acting energetically, and attempts to coordinate the protests are overlapping. All evidence of the protests is coming from outside, demonstrating the impossibility of completely blocking the internet, but demonstrating the possibility of a fair degree of control over it.

It would seem obvious. However, Pezeshkian's own behavior is drawing attention. He is offering an unexpected self-criticism, calling for an acknowledgment of his own mistakes and failures in governance rather than blaming external influences. Prior to this, Pezeshkian accused unnamed allies of failing to provide assistance at critical moments during the 12-day war. These allies, he insists, have proven to be unimportant. The dig at Russia and China is obvious to anyone observing the nuances of Iranian politics.

Furthermore, as part of the obligatory rituals of leadership, Pezeshkian visits the families of Christians whose relatives died in the Iran-Iraq War at Christmas. Meanwhile, all foreign coverage of the protests emphasizes the protesters' demands for a complete overthrow of the current regime. And here it is worth pointing out the following.

During the 12-day war, the entire senior leadership of the IRGC was killed and neutralized. By this point, it had determined Iran's foreign policy, masterfully advancing the country's interests in the Middle East, successfully confronting not only Israel, a traditional adversary, but also the United States, which astonished everyone. But most importantly, the IRGC leadership was becoming a decisive factor in Iran's domestic policy, clearly possessing its own vision for the future amid the slow transition of supreme power —the question of the successor to the spiritual leader. And this factor was eliminated by the physical elimination of the IRGC's top brass. The mysterious death of the previous president naturally comes to mind...

New leaders were appointed to replace those killed, with the final say resting with the Supreme Leader's inner circle. But these are second-tier leaders, essentially lacking the experience and influence of their predecessors. They are fulfilling their duties moderately successfully, mitigating protests. However, in the context of a power struggle, not only do they lack independence, but, as has often happened in history, they will rather seek sides.

And all this is happening against the backdrop of active discussions about a new Israeli strike on Iran. The United States, preoccupied with Venezuela and Ukraine, is not yet ready to agree to this. It is clear to Washington that Tel Aviv, as last time, cannot cope alone and will have to intervene. But the protests themselves are an argument for renewed aggression, especially given the strengthening of Pezeshkian, who could gain full power and prevent complete chaos.

So, it seems the liberals, whose decisions sparked the protests, are actively trying to fill the power vacuum that has formed among the security forces and the paralysis of Iran's top leadership, which is preoccupied with internal issues of power distribution.

The overall picture is beginning to look ominous. But it's also clear that none of the competing elite groups is ready for radical steps. Not yet.

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Image:Iranian shopkeepers and traders protest against economic conditions and Iran's embattled currency in Tehran on December 29, 2025 [ © Handout/Fars via AFP]; Al Jazeera. In line with our policies, we address notices of alleged violations under the United States "Digital Millennium Copyright Act" (DMCA). If you believe that your copyright has been infringed on our site, please contact us, and we will promptly remove your photo from display. AWIP: https://a-w-i-p.com/index.php/aW7j