Andrew Korybko
Andrew Korybko's Newsletter

For whatever one might think about the morality of Russia’s decision-making process, it was the regional military governor who irresponsibly assembled this legitimate target in Sumy, which he then surrounded with de facto human shields in a failed attempt to deter Russia.

Ukraine accused Russia of committing a war crime after Palm Sunday’s missile strike on Sumy. Kiev’s claim that Russia targeted churchgoers was echoed by Trump’s Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg, but the Russian Defense Ministry insisted that it targeted “a meeting of the command staff of the Seversk operational-tactical group”, which Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov later added was attended by NATO servicemen. Trump also chimed in and said that “I was told they (Russia) made a mistake, it was terrible.”

A debate is therefore raging over whether this was a war crime like Ukraine claimed, a terrible mistake like Trump alleged, or a legitimate strike like Russia insists. In the order that these explanations were shared, Ukraine’s is aimed at further rallying the West to apply more pressure upon Trump to pull the US out of its talks with Russia. Claiming that Russia deliberately targeted churchgoers on Palm Sunday is meant to make it more difficult for these talks to continue and for Trump to one day meet Putin again.

As for Trump’s explanation of events, he wasn’t going to discredit himself by denying that it took place, but he also didn’t want to fall into Ukraine’s trap of lending credence to its war crime claim. That’s why he instead opted for the middle ground of acknowledging what happened but attributing it to some vague “mistake” by Russia such as a wayward missile or faulty intelligence. Trump can’t approve of any Russian strike that causes civilian casualties, but he also won’t let such ruin their ongoing talks either.

And finally, Russia’s explanation maintains the country’s integrity by insisting that the targets were legitimate, though it also accounts for the reported civilian casualties by mentioning how Ukraine employs de facto human shields by illegally deploying military assets in civilian areas. While critics might scoff at this version, it is lent credence by the mayor of nearby Konotop declaring on video that the regional military governor “organized an award ceremony for the soldiers of the 117th brigade” that day.

Andrew Korybko
Andrew Korybko's Newsletter

Orban’s Fiercely Pro-Israeli Policies Put Many Alt-Media Folks In A Dilemma. They experience cognitive dissonance due to him being both a Zionist and pragmatic towards Russia.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban announced that his country will withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC) in protest of the arrest warrant that it issued for his Israeli counterpart Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu on war crimes charges. This coincided with Orban hosting Bibi in Budapest. Both were bold moves considering how highly his European peers regard the ICC and how lowly many of them now regard Bibi. Non-Western attitudes towards Bibi are similar but more mixed when it comes to the ICC.

Orban was already Europe’s black sheep due to his consistent advocacy for peace in Ukraine and criticism of the EU’s warmongering against Russia, the overall stance of which was responsible for many across the non-West having positive views about him. They might begin souring on him, however, since the non-Western public also very strongly supports Palestine and thus has very negative views about Bibi. Some Alt-Media influencers and outlets might even flip the script to condemn Orban as a “Zionist”.

Andrew Korybko
Andrew Korybko's Newsletter

Ukraine Further Discredited Itself After Budanov Doubled Down On Defending Wartime Censorship. He inadvertently legitimized Western observers critically re-evaluating certain official narratives.

GUR chief Kirill Budanov doubled down earlier this month on defending Ukraine’s wartime censorship policy. According to him, “During wartime, knowing the whole truth is not necessary. Otherwise, people may develop opinions. Some minds are not prepared to grasp the harsh reality. Let’s not put them to the test. Everything should be dosed.” He’s basically saying that Ukrainians might react so negatively to the truth that they could end up harming perceived national security interests.

Although Budanov didn’t elaborate, he was probably implying that drastic shifts in public opinion brought about by widespread knowledge of the truth could prompt some of his compatriots to destabilize the situation behind the front lines through large-scale protests, strikes, and even sabotage. Moreover, his candidness also harms Ukraine’s perceived national interests, albeit in a different way than the aforesaid by legitimizing Western observers’ critical re-evaluations of certain official narratives.

For instance, it might now no longer be as taboo for them to question Ukraine’s claim that Russia inexplicably butchered the residents of Bucha during its withdrawal from Kiev in spring 2022, which Zelensky exploited as one of the pretexts for pulling out of their peace talks. Moscow insisted that it wasn’t responsible for that war crime, but its position was ignored by the West, though some brave journalists might now revisit what happened and lend more credence to its false flag arguments.

Ukraine’s accusations that Russia bombed civilian targets might also be critically re-evaluated. Instead of continuing to take these claims for granted, they might now be seen as examples of wartime censorship for covering up the misfiring of Ukrainian air defense missiles or their accidental landing in population centers, exactly as Russia has always alleged was what happened. Proof of Ukraine deploying military assets there, which would be legitimate targets under international law, might also be uncovered.

Andrew Korybko
Andrew Korybko's Newsletter

Five Details That Most Observers Missed From SIPRI’s Latest International Arms Trends Report: They’re not as significant as the fact sheet’s top takeaways, but they’re still worth knowing about.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which is regarded as the top authority on the international arms trade, released its latest report about related trends from 2020-2024 last month.

Their fact sheet did a nice job pointing out such trends as the 64% drop in Russian arms exports between 2015-2019 and 2020-2024 as well as Qatar more than doubling its arms imports to become the world’s third-largest importer, but there are still five details that evaded most observers:

1. Israel Isn’t Among The US’ Top Ten Arms Recipients

SIPRI casually mentioned that “Israel was the 11th largest recipient of US arms exports in 2020–24 with a share of 3.0 per cent” right after reporting that Saudi Arabia received 12% and Qatar 7.7%. Framed differently, the Saudis received four times as many arms as Israel did and Qatar two and a half times, which challenges popular perceptions of Israel’s role in the US’ military-industrial complex. These facts deserve further reflection, but the conclusions might upset some activists in the Alt-Media Community.

Andrew Korybko
Andrew Korybko's Newsletter

The Three Goals That Trump Wants To Achieve Through His Global Trade War: He hopes to strengthen the US’ supply chain sovereignty, renegotiate its ties with all countries with a view towards getting them to distance themselves from China, and shape the emerging world order.

Trump’s decision to tariff the entire world to varying extents as revenge for their tariffs against the US has shaken the global economy to its core. Instead of restoring free and fair trade like he claims to want, which would give American companies an advantage, he might inadvertently accelerate regionalization trends and the subsequent division of the world into a collection of trade blocs. Even in that scenario, however, he could still advance the three unstated goals that are responsible for this policy.

The first is to strengthen the US’ supply chain sovereignty so as to eliminate the leverage that other countries have over it. This might not be pursued solely for the sake of it, but perhaps also as contingency planning, thus hinting at concerns about a major war. The two most likely adversaries are China and Iran, and a hot conflict with either would throw the global economy into turmoil. Trump might therefore want to prioritize reshoring in order for the US to preemptively minimize the consequences.

Andrew Korybko
Andrew Korybko's Newsletter

Trump’s latest sanctions threat against Russia suggests that he’s getting impatient for a deal. This moment of truth could even arrive earlier than expected and thus force Putin to compromise or escalate before he’s fully made up his mind either way.

Trump said in an interview with NBC News that “If Russia and I are unable to make a deal on stopping the bloodshed in Ukraine, and if I think it was Russia’s fault — which it might not be — but if I think it was Russia’s fault, I am going to put secondary tariffs on oil, on all oil coming out of Russia. That would be that if you buy oil from Russia, you can’t do business in the United States. There will be a 25% tariff on all oil, a 25- to 50-point tariff on all oil.”

NBC News interpreted this as alluding to what he earlier threatened on social media regarding the imposition of secondary sanctions on those that purchase oil from Venezuela.

He wrote that “any Country that purchases Oil and/or Gas from Venezuela will be forced to pay a Tariff of 25% to the United States on any Trade they do with our Country.” As it relates to Russia, this would spike tariffs on China and India, the first of which is already in a trade war with the US while the second wants to avoid one.

This is precisely the former US Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg insinuated in an interview with the New York Post in early February that was analyzed here at the time.

The takeaway was that such threats might suffice for getting them to nudge Russia into a deal over Ukraine despite whatever apprehensions Putin might have. The consequences of not doing so could be their compliance with the US’ secondary sanctions and all that could entail for the Russian economy if it’s deprived of this revenue.

Andrew Korybko
Andrew Korybko's Newsletter

What’s most important is that Putin and Trump trust one another, their representatives have excellent working relations with each other, and these two leaders are aware of the challenges posed by Ukraine and Europe.

Russia and the US confirmed their mutual intent on Tuesday to revive the grain deal, though Russia’s statement conditioned this on the US finally complying with the original deal’s provisions, namely the removal of sanctions and other obstacles to the export of Russia’s agricultural goods and fertilizer. Ukraine agreed in separate talks with the US, also in Saudi Arabia, to revive the deal as well. Both Russia and Ukraine also confirmed their willingness to adhere to the 30-day energy infrastructure ceasefire.

These two arrangements that have been agreed to thus far, the aforementioned energy ceasefire and the complementary one in the Black Sea, build upon last year’s respective efforts by Qatar and Turkiye that were analyzed at the time in the two preceding hyperlinks. They fell flat due to Ukraine changing its mind at the last minute on the brink of another grain deal last spring, using last summer’s energy ceasefire talks to dupe Russia ahead of invading Kursk, and the US’ lack of interest in pressuring Ukraine.

While Ukraine remains capricious and deceitful, its expulsion from most of Kursk as well as Trump’s willingness to pressure Zelensky as proven by his temporary suspension of military and intelligence aid to Ukraine changed the strategic dynamics, thus allowing for these breakthroughs. As could have been predicted, Ukraine has repeatedly violated the energy infrastructure ceasefire and will likely violate the revived Black Sea one too, but the trust between Putin and Trump will likely keep everything on track.

Andrew Korybko
Andrew Korybko's Newsletter

Will Russia Expand Its Ground Campaign Into Sumy, Dniepropetrovsk, And/Or Kharkov Regions? This might be the only way to ensure Ukraine’s demilitarization if diplomacy fails.

The nascent Russian-US “New Détente didn’t lead to a ceasefire during the latest Putin-Trump call, thus meaning that the hot phase of the Ukrainian Conflict continues, albeit with a proposed cessation of attacks on energy infrastructure provided that Kiev agrees. At present, Russia is on the brink of completely pushing Ukrainian forces out of Russia’s Kursk Region and into Ukraine’s Sumy Region, while the southwestern Donbass front has seen Russian troops approach the gates of Dniepropetrovsk Region.

Putin will soon be faced with the fateful choice of either keeping Russia’s ground campaign limited to those four former Ukrainian regions that voted to join Russia in September 2022’s referenda or expanding it to include Sumy, Dniepropetrovsk, and/or (once again) Kharkov Regions. The second scenario is attractive is because it could enable Russia to go around frontline defenses in Donbass and/or Zaporozhye and thus advance its goal of fully capturing the entirety of the regions that it claims.

Andrew Korybko
Andrew Korybko's Newsletter

Europe’s Reported Plan To Replace The US In NATO Ignores The Interests Of Five Key Countries. It’s strongly implied that Poland, the Baltic States, and Romania prefer to remain under the US’ security umbrella.

The Financial Times (FT) cited four unnamed European officials to report that “European military powers work on 5-10 year plan to replace US in Nato”. The UK, France, Germany, and the Nordic nations are named as those that want to present this proposal to the US during the next NATO Summit in June.

They also reported that some countries have refused to participate in these talks either out of fear that this could encourage the US to move faster in this regard or due to their belief that it won’t abandon Europe.

FT is likely referring to Poland, the Baltic States, and Romania, the most important countries on NATO’s eastern flank, all of whom prefer to remain under the US’ security umbrella. Poland’s recent flirtation with France could herald a full-blown pivot if the ruling liberal-globalists win May’s presidential election, but for now it functions as an attempt to rebalance ties with the US amidst uncertainty over its future plans. It can also be seen as a misguided negotiation tactic to keep and expand the US’ military presence. As for the Baltic States, they have a diehard pro-American elite, and they’ll only realign towards the EU in the event that they’re forced to do so by Trump unilaterally curtailing or even totally removing US troops from their territories as part of a grand deal with Russia.

Andrew Korybko
Andrew Korybko's Newsletter

The sequence of events that would have to transpire in order to turn this into a reality are that: the next NATO leader and his team end up being hawkish on this issue; Polish policymakers overcome their differences and agree that it’s worth the risks; and the US gives them the greenlight.

Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski told the Financial Times in an interview earlier this week that “Membership in Nato does not trump each country’s responsibility for the protection of its own airspace — it’s our own constitutional duty. I’m personally of the view that, when hostile missiles are on course of entering our airspace, it would be legitimate self-defence [to strike them] because once they do cross into our airspace, the risk of debris injuring someone is significant.”

Foreign Ministry spokesman Pawel Wronski clarified that these was Sikorski’s own personal views and don’t reflect Poland’s official ones, elaborating that “If we have the capability and Ukraine agrees, then we should consider it. But ultimately, this is the minister's personal opinion.” Nevertheless, their comments still suggested that this scenario might once again be in the cards under certain conditions despite having earlier been rebuffed by the US, UK, and NATO. Here are three background briefings:

● 17 April: “It Would Be Surprising If Polish Patriot Systems Were Used To Protect Western Ukraine”
● 18 July: “Ukraine Likely Feels Jaded After NATO Said That It Won’t Allow Poland To Intercept Russian   Missiles”
● 30 August: “Poland Finally Maxed Out Its Military Support For Ukraine”

The last of these three included Zelensky’s most recent demand at the time to shoot down Russian missiles over Ukraine. He said that “We have talked a lot about this and we need, as I understand it, the support of several countries. Poland ... hesitates to be alone with this decision. It wants the support of other countries in NATO. I think this would lead to a positive decision by Romania.” That same analysis also cited Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz’s response to him too.